In September 2012, while hundreds of refugees are held in inhuman conditions at the police stations of Lesbos or they are left out in the open vulnerable to any racist attacks; the “Village of all together” requests the municipality of Mitilini to allow the use of the abandoned summer camps in Neapoli to be used as a hospitality center for the refugees. With this act, the “Village of all together” defends the right of the refugees to a fair
treatment and simultaneously, it promotes the creation of open hospitality centers in support of local community.

PIKPA is a self-managed-autonomous space and has no access to any state or European funds. This self-managed space has hosted during this time more than 6.000 refugees, some for few days and others up to a year. The refugees include asylum and family unification applicants and/or vulnerable groups of newly arrived refugees e.g. people with disabilities, sick, pregnant etc. There, we offer food, clothes, medicines, hygiene, legal counseling, and medical help as well as we organize activities for children and classes of Greek and English and occasionally, we provide them transport expenses and social support.

Due to the growing number of refugees arriving in Lesbos on a daily basis, the “Village of all together” is in constant need of resources and funds to cover the increasing needs of these people as well as to maintain the human living conditions in the camp. Although the core of our activities are centred in the PIKPA summer camp, we are in continuous communication with other groups of our network to better assess the situation and the needs,
offering help where is needed, on the streets, at the port and other self-created camps.

Our main objective is to stand in solidarity with the refugees and fight against the illegal arrests and any practice of humiliation or atrocities conducted in the sea or at the borders e.g. In June 2015 and while the law was still criminalizing any altruistic acts, we, the “Village of all together” organized a convoy with over forty cars that traveled from Molivo to Mitilini in order to transport refugees to the hospitality center. Moreover, we participated
in trials against citizens who transported refugees to the cities when the respective authorities pointing the law, were leaving thousands of people walking long distances all over the island.

Currently, we act as the focal point among medical centres, social pharmacies and other medical groups all over the country in order to provide sufficient medical services to the refugees. Our aim is to create proper reception and hospitality centres for every refugee as well any Greek national who has been a victim of the economic crisis, racism and any xenophobic propaganda.

If you want to support the volunteers in Lesvos, here are the details, received from Efi Latsoudi

Village of all together

IBAN: GR7901107620000076271413353

SWIFT (BIC) ETHNGRAA

Michalis Aivaliotis

Milou 10

Pirgrelia

Mytilene / Greece

SYRIZA’s mild Keynesian programme has been gutted. Is a more democratic economic alternative possible within the framework of the EU?

SYRIZA’s victory in the Greek elections of 25 January raised a wave of hope across Europe.  The dominance of the austerity-oriented conservative and social democratic parties was at last challenged by the victory of a leftist anti-austerity party, signalling a possible change of course in Europe.

But one month into a SYRIZA-led administration, the prospects look much gloomier.  SYRIZA is committed to Greece remaining within the Eurozone, and that requires the agreement of several powerful institutions (EU, ECB, IMF) and the tolerance of the core economic elites of Europe.  This was not forthcoming.  The new Greek Government was quickly challenged by a liquidity blackmail originated by the ECB and supported by the German government and the EU leadership.  It soon became apparent that even mildly reversing austerity and prioritising the tackling of the humanitarian crisis – the main pillars of SYRIZA’s Keynesian programme – have no place in the EU as currently constituted.

In late 2014, the previous coalition government of conservatives and social democrats refused the EU Commission’s offer to extend the bailout programme until the summer asking an extension until the end of February instead.  In this way, the newly elected government faced an immediate liquidity danger and was forced into a negotiation with the EU under unfavourable terms.  After repeated Eurogroup meetings, the new government practically gave up on the bulk of its programme so as to buy some time (four months).  According to the common Eurogroup statement of 20 February, and the letter of the Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis of 23 February, with the first commitments the Greek government agreed to leave practically untouched all privatisations and the majority of the budget cuts of the last four years and practically committed not to intervene to the banking sector.  All the sovereign debt is recognised as payable.  The Troika’s labour market deregulation laws are to be carefully evaluated, and partly changed, but definitely not reversed.  The raising of the national minimum wage will be subject to the approval of the EU, while further wage cuts in the public sector are not excluded (without adjustment of the wage floors).  The government is committed to abandoning all possibilities of early retirement, meaning the neoliberal pension reforms remain, while the already-realised pension reductions and the implementation of the pay-as-you-go system of the previous governments must remain untouched.

The abolition of Troika’s ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) was the most central element of SYRIZA’s political campaign since 2011, and is the basis of the mandate it received in the recent elections.  Yet the new Eurogroup agreement refers to the MoU as the ‘existing arrangement’.  Moreover, EU Commissioners and Eurogroup’s Chairman Jeroen Djisselbloem publicly claimed the deal is about the extension of the MoU.

The SYRIZA-led government managed to avoid, for the moment, some of the remaining demands of the Troika under the MoU – like further reductions in pensions and changes to the laws on strikes and the funding of unions – but failed to abolish the bulk of it.  It got an extension of the same loan agreement – without any renegotiation of its characteristics – and the MoU will be evaluated with Varoufakis’ aforementioned letter as the ‘starting point’.

Nothing prevents the EU from coming back and insisting on the implementation of all measures included in the MoU, even if they are not in Varoufakis’s list, whilst the IMF has objected that the Greek letter ‘is not conveying clear assurances that the Government intends to undertake the reforms envisaged in the Memorandum’.  It notes in particular the commitment in the MoU to pension and VAT reforms, to opening up of closed sectors and privatisations, as well as administrative and labour reforms, and it emphasises that the ‘completion of the review’ cannot ‘be successful […] within the policy perimeters outlined in the Government’s list’.

The text of the Eurozone deal itself includes major impediments to the implementation of SYRIZA’s manifesto of 2014, known as the Thessaloniki programme.[1]  But the worst is that it gives the EU and the IMF the right to veto any law or reform with any economic impact introduced in the next four months.[2] The following table compares SYRIZA’s most important electoral pledges (included in the Thessaloniki programme) with the Eurogroup’s deal, or the list of measures included in ‘Varoufakis’ letter’ accepted by the EU as ‘a valid starting point for a successful conclusion of the [MoU’s] review’:

The first pillar of the Thessaloniki programme was a €2 billion bill to deal with the humanitarian crisis.  This included free electricity and food support to 300,000 households living in poverty, free healthcare to all, and subsidised rent for tens of thousands of citizens to combat homelessness.  It also included the restoration of the so called thirteenth pension (end of year bonus) for pensions below €700.  Now any decision impacting on the budget can be vetoed by the EU.  On the top of that, the government has committed to paying €22 billion on servicing the debt this year and still coming out with more than a 1.5% budget surplus.  Each 1% of fiscal surplus means €1.8 billion less for humanitarian relief.  In addition, non-salary and non-pension government expenditures are to be ‘rationalised’.  In a second letter sent by Varoufakis to the Eurogroup on 6 March 2015, the cost of the programme is reduced to 200 million.  Free electricity will finally be provided to only half of the households programmed (150,000) while the provision of free healthcare and the ‘thirteenth pension’ have disappeared.  All the cost is supposed to be covered by cuts in the expenditure of government ministries and a new system of public tenders which is expected to save €140 million.[3]

The second pillar of the Thessaloniki programme was about ‘restarting the economy’ by halting the ‘tax repression’ of the economically active part of the population.  The backbone of this pillar was the plan to help citizens with tax debts by breaking them into small (100) instalments, writing-off about half of these debts for those that pay up to April, restoring the limit of tax free income to €12,000 a year and cancelling the housing tax for small housing properties.  However, the EU is expected to add many conditions to these measures, with which the government had estimated it would receive €3 billion in revenues in the first year.  In the second letter sent by Varoufakis, writing off parts of tax arrears is replaced by ‘strict payment discipline’ as in the similar programme that was put forward by the previous government and finally rejected by the Troika.  The likely beneficiaries are also reduced since whoever misses a payment is now excluded automatically from the programme.

The other flagship measure of the second pillar was the restructuring of ‘bad loans’ made by banks to households and businesses.  SYRIZA proposed creating a public body that would buy and restructure this debt (which amounts to €77 billion) using €3 billion from the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF).[4]  But this proposal has already been killed off by the Eurogroup deal, which made clear these funds ‘can only be used for bank recapitalisation and resolution costs’.  In any case,  these funds have in fact already been returned to European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)/ European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and Greek banks can apply directly to the ECB/SSM by the end of June to use them.  But even if the Greek government could use these funds, they would still be insufficient to deal with the volume of the bad loans.

The third pillar of SYRIZA’s programme is referred to as ‘re-conquering labour’, and is perhaps the one most fatally undermined by the Eurogroup deal and Varoufakis’s letter.  Since the government agreed to refrain ‘from any rollback of measures [...] that would negatively impact [...] economic recovery [...], as assessed by the institutions’, any re-establishment of the collective bargaining system and arbitration mechanism that was demolished by the Troika would surely be vetoed.  In the place of the old system, the Varoufakis letter talks about ‘a new “smart” approach to collective wage bargaining that balances the needs for flexibility with fairness’.

The creation of 300,000 new jobs and the provision of 300,000 new unemployment allowances are now out of question, especially given that the €3 billion expected from tax reforms will be lost to servicing the debt and achieving a budget surplus.  In line with the 2011 Euro plus pact, Varoufakis’s letter pledges that ‘changes in wages’ will be ‘in line with productivity developments and competitiveness’.  With no investments in sight to improve productivity, and no other factor to drive Greek capital’s competitiveness other than low wages, this effectively rules out any wage increases.

Prospects are bleak for the public sector workers as well.  Varoufakis’s promise to freeze ‘the public sector’s wage bill’ and deliver ‘wage distribution through productivity gains’ means any improvement in the €600 salary that newly appointed doctors and teachers now receive, forcing them below the poverty line, is unlikely.  The Greek public sector has lost more than 200,000 employees since 2010, resulting in the radical degradation of basic services to the people.  One of SYRIZA’s electoral pledges was to hire back around 4,000 people who were illegally fired by the previous government.  Now it says these people will be included in the 15,000 public sector jobs the previous government announced it would create.  The Greek public sector needs much more of a boost on recruitments to become functional again.

An indication on the direction of the compromises that were made by SYRIZA is given by the position of the Greek employers.  While SYRIZA enjoys massive support among the working class around the country, it was the Federation of Greek Employers (SEV) who saluted the measures in Varoufakis’s letter and called citizens to ‘support the government’s agenda with fortitude and faith’!

What comes after the four month period?

This four month programme extension will unfortunately not be the end of the EU’s tutelage over Greece.  According to the government, this is only a bridge programme to be replaced in June by a permanent ‘contractual agreement’.  Greece’s unsustainable sovereign debt will need fresh cash to be serviced, and European tax payers will once again be forced to contribute to this black hole.  There is little prospect that any new economic programme attached to a new loan will be a programme for growth and social justice as SYRIZA would like.  On the contrary, it will likely have the same characteristics as the existing austerity programme.  Within this framework, it is difficult to imagine any improvement in Greece’s most extreme socio-economic problems; namely the 1.3 million unemployed, the 60% of working people unable to make ends meet, the three million people with no access healthcare and the lack of public investment which has led to a lost generation and a generalised feeling of depression.  Since it is actually questionable whether the Thessaloniki programme would be enough to put an end this social and economic disaster, one can only imagine what the consequences will be now that even this programme has been gutted.

Lessons to be learned

If one thing has become clear, it is that the long-expected change of course in Greece and the EU more broadly, will not come just because SYRIZA has come to power.  The question that emerges is whether things could have gone, and can still go, differently.  Is it possible for a left government in an austerity hit country to apply even a mild Keynesian policy while remaining within the eurozone and the EU? The answer is simply NO!

The EU institutions under the leadership of Germany have used all the means at their disposal to force the Greek government to backtrack from its programme.  Without new loans, Greece can’t service its existing debt, and the ECB (acting on behalf of the EU) has already threatened to cut off liquidity to enforce harsh neoliberal reforms, as it did in negotiations with Italy, Ireland and Cyprus.

In addition to the financial ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (liquidity and debt), the EU has numerous tools to discipline governments deviating from austerity policies, even when it hasn’t bailed them out.  The rules of economic governance in the EU give the European Commission the ability to review the yearly budgets of the countries, and to demand changes and apply fines to countries that deviate from its recommendations.  They can also freeze the structural funds[5] for a country that does not follow their recommendations on reducing deficits and sanctions can now also be imposed on countries for not dealing with ‘a macroeconomic imbalance’ the way the Commission recommends.  One of the rules imposed is the capping of the growth of nominal labour unit cost[6] at 9% for Eurozone countries and 12% for non-Eurozone countries for three consecutive years.  This effectively bars the redistribution of GDP from capital to labour through wages.  Such rules of economic governance are based on hardline neoliberal principles, and their interpretation is at the discretion of the organs of the EU (i.e. the European Commission) which are not subject to any democratic control.  Legislation on ‘competition’ and liberalisation also prohibits treating energy, mass transport, telecommunications or finance as public services.  In this context, there is just no room for manoeuvre for even a mild Keynesian economic programme.

Opposition to the dominant EU project has been on the rise not just in Greece, but also in Spain, and to a lesser extent in other countries too, like Slovenia and Portugal.  Left-wing forces have invested politically in the idea of pushing for progressive reform of the EU.  However, the demands of the social movements that these forces seek to represent – for more democracy, more commons, less unemployment and precariousness, work with rights and a more decent life – are clearly in contradiction with the political, legal and institutional structure of the EU.  What strategy then should be followed vis-à-vis the EU by political and social forces that aim to break with neoliberalism?

Changing the legislation on economic governance and infrastructure liberalisation would require a ‘qualified majority’ in the Council, while overcoming the European Fiscal Compact and other treaties would require unanimity.  We can be sure the socio-political conditions will never be favourable for the radical left to form governments in 16 out of the 28 countries, representing 65% of the EU’s population.  Applying disobedience to current EU treaties and legislation, therefore, is the only way for left governments to follow different policies.  Moreover, several institutions with substantial financial and political power (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the European Stability Mechanism) lie beyond any immediate democratic control, and will always be able to take action against any undesirable political change at the EU level.

The only way for (radical) left governments to overcome these constraints is to regain monetary power by introducing national currencies under democratic control.  This would also require abolishing the ‘independence’ of their central bank and re-appropriating the capacity to create their own liquidity.  Such a programme should also include the nationalisation of private banks and the introduction of capital controls to avoid capital flight and find resources for job-creation and public investment.  Finally, it would require an end to the servicing of sovereign debt and an invitation to creditors to negotiate on this basis.[7]

The necessary requirement for a left political programme to succeed is that the political power of the forces it represents must extend further than the government.  It must be deeply rooted in mass movements and have the active support of the people.  Left movements must go much further than trying to ease the suffering caused by neoliberal policies, and aim at building an economy orientated towards serving the majority of people, while respecting the planet and the needs of future generations.  For a programme to be successful, an alternative vision must take roots in the hearts and minds of people, and this can only happen if it is concretely put in place with grass-roots initiatives and cooperative local economies leading the effort.

Greece now has four months to decide whether it wants to continue under the austerity straightjacket imposed by Schauble, Dijsselbloem, Draghi, Juncker and Lagarde, or to show the rest of Europe that a different path is possible.  The Left all over Europe should take note of the severe constraints that a an anti-austerity government faces within the Euro and the Treaties.  Juncker has remarked that ‘there can be no democratic choice against the European treaties’ – if he is right, it follows that a genuinely democratic economic alternative will only be possible outside of the framework of EU.

Dimitris Pavlopoulos works as an assistant professor at the department of Sociology of the Free University of Amsterdam. His research concerns the socioeconomic consequences of flexible employment.

Yiorgos Vassalos is a political scientist specialising in interest representation in the EU. He worked for six years for Corporate Europe Observatory and is now writing his PhD on financial lobbying. He is also active in anti-austerity movements.

However, even these minimal demands made by the Greek side seems to be not easily accepted by the rest of the EU governments. They insist that the current government honor the promises of the previous government and comply with the memoranda. EU leaders, even though some of them come
from socialdemocratic parties, try to apply the toughest neoliberal measures people have ever seen not only to Greece but to the whole of Europe. At the same time, they try to convince us that those measures are successful.

Yet the only thing those measures brought to Greece was the disaster of its economy and the penury of the people’s majority: unemployment rose to 25% and 3 million people have no access to medical insurance. The only achievement of those measures -and essentially what they only soughtwas
rescuing European banks from bankruptcy as well as rescuing the profiteers who rise to wealth through the Greek debt.

The experiment that the EU, the IMF and the ECB applied to Greece in cooperation with the corrupted Greek governments will go down in history as the most cruel and inhumane one within the European Union. Analogous measures (pay cuts, abolishment of the social state and abolishment of
work rights) are applied to all European countries as they are in the Netherlands too by Rutte’s cabinet. In every case, the outcome is the increase of unemployment and poverty, while multiplying the profits of big companies and the incomes of the richest 1% of the population.

EU’s attitude towards the Greek people proves its real face. The European Union operates as a brutal executioner of the Greek people and overtly defends the interests of the Greek and the European elite which benefits from the crisis on the Greek people’s shoulders.

The Greek people have already lost a lot and will not draw back. The European Union must accept the Greek people’s decision to reverse the policies towards Greece. The Greek government has no right to withdraw from the Greek people’s decision. The people’s right to live in decency, to democracy and to access to health, education and social care is not negotiable. Greece’s public debt was not created by the people and must not be paid by the people. The more the Greek people are forced to pay that debt the more every policy change will essentially remain impossible. That is why we demand its erasure!

We ask for the support of the Dutch people as well as that of the rest peoples of Europe. Every victory of the Greek people’s demands against the Eurogroup will also be a victory of European people against the policy of cuts and the abolishment of the social state and work rights.

We do not compromise, we do not retreat.

The crisis must be paid by those who created it.

ReINFORM

- the write off of the debt

- the end of the austerity policies in Greece and in the Netherlands.

We fight

- so that we don’t allow the banks to lead our lives

- for the right of the people to make their own destiny.

Venceremos

In this event, we want to go further than just challenging the media propaganda. The roots but also the aims of austerity and reform policies will be discussed. Who are the winners of these policies? What will the economy and the political system look like after their full implementation? What was the role of the participation of Greece to the EU and the euro for the development of the crisis as the crisis in the Eurozone started from Greece?

Three critical scholars will provide their contribution to the discussion:

Kees van der Pijl, emeritus professor at the University of Sussex, will give the broader context of the issue from an international perspective and will present the Dutch context as well.
Yiorgos Vassalos, political scientist in Brussels, will evaluate the 30-year long participation of Greece to the EU.
Dimitris Pavlopoulos, assistant professor at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, will talk about the winners and losers of the austerity policies in Greece

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/events/275719382636460

In contrast to what happened in other European countries, the Podemos phenomenon prevented that in Spain the frustration and discontent resulting from the EU austerity policies led to a raise of the support to far-right parties. A recent survey showed that Podemos does not only canalize the frustration but that it is close to being the second political force in Spain, with serious possibilities to govern the country in the short term. What are the causes of this political phenomenon? Which implications does it have for European politics? Is it possible to imagine a similar development in the Netherlands?

We will discuss this and other questions with Pablo Echenique (Member of the European Parliament from Podemos), Hilary Wainwright (TNI fellow and Research Director of the New Politics program) and Justus Uitermark (Associate Professor at the University of Amsterdam and the Gradus Hendriks Professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam).

Free entrance. We suggest a contribution of 5 Euros to cover the costs of the event.
Language: English with translation to Spanish available.
Coffee and tea will be served from 15.30.

Places limited, please confirm your place writing to: fenomenopodemos(at)gmail.com

El fenómeno Podemos y nuevas formas de participación política

Con sólo unos meses de existencia el partido político Podemos recibió más de un millón de votos en las elecciones europeas que resultaron en cinco europarlamentarios. La regeneración democrática y alternativas a las medidas de austeridad de la UE son temas centrales de su programa político el cual, – así como la selección de candidatos – fue configurado a través de internet con la participación de decenas de miles de ciudadanos.

A diferencia de en otros países Europeos, el fenómeno Podemos ha evitado que en el estado español el descontento y frustración consecuencia de las medidas de austeridad de la UE hayan sido capitalizados por los partidos de extrema derecha. Más allá de canalizar la frustración, en una reciente encuesta Podemos está a pocos votos de convertirse en la segunda fuerza política con más apoyo en el estado español y con serias opciones de gobernar el país en el corto plazo. ¿Cuáles son las causas de este fenómeno político? ¿Qué implicaciones tiene para la política Europea? ¿Es posible imaginar un fenómeno similar en los Países Bajos?

Discutiremos estas y otras preguntas con Pablo Echenique (Europarlamentario de Podemos), Hilary Wainwright (TNI fellow & Directora de Investigación del Programa sobre Nuevas Prácticas Políticas) y Justus Uitermark (Associate Professor at the University of Amsterdam and the Gradus Hendriks Professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam).

Entrada libre, sugerimos una contribución de 5 Euros para cubrir los costes del evento.
Idioma: Inglés con traducción al español disponible.
Se servirá café y té desde las 15.30.

Aforo limitado, por favor confirma tu asistencia enviado un email a: fenomenopodemos(at)gmail.com

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/events/511138332354966/?ref=48

Benny Tai Yiu-ting, who put the original call out for the campaign of civil disobedience, spoke to Luke Cooper in Hong Kong shortly before the Chinese government confirmed the worst fears of the public with its recent announcement.

LC: Benny, I know that you’ve played a leading role in founding the Occupy Central movement over the last period. Perhaps we could start with an explanation of what led you to make the original call for a campaign of civil disobedience.

BT: That’s a long story. I’ve been involved in the democratic movement for thirty years, since I was a student at Hong Kong University in the mid-1980s. At that time, it was just the start of the Hong Kong democratic movement. We were striving for the election of our legislature – not yet for the chief executive because we were still under colonial rule and no such position existed. The ruling governor was still just ‘sent to us’ from London. Then I graduated and started to work at the university. I played less of a front line role, becoming more of a commentator and researcher. As a legal scholar, I was interested in constitutional law, which obviously has a very close relationship with the democratic movement and constitutional development.

After twenty years teaching and playing a less frontline role in the democratic movement, in 2013 we reached a point in Hong Kong where we needed to think about a way to achieve true universal suffrage in 2017 for our chief executive election. China has promised that we can have universal suffrage, but what do they mean by this? They tend to play with the concept. The kind of universal suffrage they say Hong Kong could have is just the right to vote, but who can you vote for? That will be something controlled by the nominating committee. And the nominating committee composition will follow the structure of the existing election committee – who are responsible for deciding the Chief Executive now – and represents a small circle of the elite with only a very narrow base in society.

This kind of universal suffrage, I like to call it “Chinese characteristics of universal suffrage”, will not be able to stand alongside what we believe to be the internationally accepted standards of universal suffrage. If that is the position of Beijing in the internal politics of Hong Kong, then we currently have no way to match their power. We must find some ways to raise and increase our bargaining power in the coming negotiation. We have used big rallies in the past. Sometimes these have been successful. Sometimes they have failed in achieving our goals.

But this time, because we are touching on something very important to Beijing, I suggested we have to find some other methods to achieve our goals. So that is why I proposed the idea of using civil disobedience. The idea of Occupy Central (‘Central’ is Hong Kong’s financial district) is borrowed from Occupy Wall Street, but with a different goal: not anti-capitalism but a democratic movement. We will have 10,000 people there with our plan clearly stated. The hope is that we can build and develop sufficient pressure for Beijing to modify the stance it has sadly taken.

LC: Could you describe how Occupy Central has developed since you put out the call?

BT: I wrote a public article suggesting the campaign in January of that year and two months later I, along with Professor Chan Kin-man and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming, put out a public call to form the Occupy Central campaign, inviting people to sign it if they agree with our goals. The three of us – coming from civil society or the academic sphere, though Reverend Chu has more links with civil society groups – wanted this action to be the property of civil society and not just the Hong Kong political parties.

We wanted to organise a movement for democracy in a democratic way. So the first thing that we did was to organise a deliberative meeting, open to all, but specifically inviting a number of civil society groups and political parties.

We had 700 people there in a half-day meeting back on 9th June 2013. We discussed and set the agenda on the day so that everyone who attended was involved.

Then we organised a series of other deliberative meetings with specific civil society groups, which each have their own networks and people to link with. So we have meetings with the churches, the social workers, the students, a number of other groups, each discussing it with their members. These took place in October to February last year. And then in May this year, we had the third deliberative meeting, which considered all the proposals put forward, with 2,500 people participating.

The last meeting chose three different proposals, which were to be put to a civil referendum. This was not an ‘official’ referendum but was organised by civil society; this allowed everyone in Hong Kong to participate and choose their favoured proposal of the three that came out of the meeting.

800,000 people voted in the referendum and we had one proposal that had the highest number of votes – which is now the proposal of the whole movement.

LC: What was common to the three proposals that came out of the meeting?

BT: In March this year, we had a group of international experts on human rights law, election law and constitutional law, who came to Hong Kong and met with local legal experts and researchers in political system design. They came up with a set of principles for international standards in the application of universal suffrage. We used this set of principles and applied it to a number of proposals and came up with 15 different options that were taken to the deliberative meeting of 2,500 people.

All three proposals included an arrangement for public nomination meaning that individual voters could jointly nominate a candidate with others – they would require simply one per cent of the total electorate, around 35,000 people. This proposal was common to the three proposals that came out of the meeting, although they had different arrangements on the composition of the nominating committee.

LC: You’ve talked about how the movement has organised itself through deliberative assemblies. The relationship between political parties and civil society has been something that is frequently discussed in the global justice movement. Could you outline the nature of the connection between the Occupy Central movement and political parties, such as the Pan-Democrats?

BT: The political parties participate in the movement not as an organisation but rather as individual members. Their members join in the deliberative meetings. When votes occur people cast their own personal vote and not the vote of a political party. This is not a coalition of the parties, and not a coalition of parties and organisations, but the decisions are instead made by individuals within the movement. We do however work together with the members of the political parties and also the civil society groups to organise the meetings, especially the second stage which saw a series of meetings with different parts of Hong Kong society. The political parties organised some of these deliberative meetings with their members, as one constituent group in society. These second stage meetings were primarily discussion. No decisions were actually made, which was the role of the larger deliberative meetings for the movement as a whole.

After this second stage we moved towards a stage of negotiations with Beijing. Now the political parties have seats in the Legislative Council so they will have the real decision making power. But through the Occupy movement we connect civil society groups with the political parties. The trust between the two sides needs to be developed. There is some existing distrust there. But we played a role in connecting the two sides. Up until this point we have still been able to maintain a coalition between the civil society groups supporting democracy and the political parties supporting democracy, in order to join together in this action. But nonetheless the relationship is very unstable and we have to work very hard to maintain it and ensure there is trust between the sides. In some respects our coalition is built on weak foundations, but up to this point we have played a role in forging unity. I am not claiming all of the credit for this, but we have played a role in connecting the parties with civil society, which is the hardest part of the movement. Maintaining this relationship is the biggest challenge that we face.

LC: As well as the 800,000 people participating in the Occupy Central referendum, there have been a number of large mobilisations in Hong Kong in recent months. The annual rallies to commemorate the 1st July Movement (which forced the withdrawal of national security legislation curtailing certain freedoms back in 2003) and the Tiananmen Massacre both attracted some 500,000 people. These were not organised by Occupy Central but there is some overlap between the constituencies mobilising. Taken together this suggests that there is a fervour in Hong Kong society for these democratic issues. But I’ve also noticed that the formation of Occupy Central has sparked considerable public commentary, far from all positive. Last Sunday, there was even a pro-Beijing demonstration against Occupy Central! Meanwhile a pro-Beijing petition has apparently received over 1 million names. Do you think its fair to say there has been a public backlash?

BT: Yes, I think there’s a clear split that exists in society about Occupy Central. Yet even though there may be a lot of people who supported the public signature campaign against Occupy Central, this is more of a top-down movement that has been carefully coordinated by Beijing groups and organisations that use their resources to win support, rather than a bottom-up campaign. I admit that while many people who have been listed as signatories may not have actually signed it, many people who went to the demonstration you mentioned may not have known why they were there, and may even have been paid to attend, there is nonetheless still a substantial number of people in Hong Kong who are truly against Occupy Central and the things we are doing.

There are 800,000 people who expressed their views through the civil referendum, supporting universal suffrage on certified international standards. But there is also a substantial number opposed to us, which may be bigger, or may be smaller, we don’t know exactly, who need to be taken seriously. We are now reaching a situation where we have two opposing views in society. So the challenge for us in how we can find a consensus between the groups.

There is also a group of moderates. And the group of moderates do not like society to be split in this way. They may not agree with Occupy Central but they think universal suffrage should be supported. So they agree with the goal of the movement, but they disagree with the means, i.e. civil disobedience. But this middle group will not join with the anti-Occupy Central campaign, because they have no demands on the meaning of universal suffrage. So they think we are wrong to occupy the central area, but want to see a substantial form of universal suffrage. We have therefore three sides. We must find a way to reach a consensus in the whole of society so that we can proceed to the future constitutional development.

LC: I know you probably won’t refer to statistics as such, but according to your impression what is the type of people that have been attracted to the Occupy Central movement, in terms of age, social class, etc?

BT: You can actually look at the survey undertaken by professors at the Baptist University Hong Kong on attitudes to the mainland and the Occupy Central movement. From the survey we found that Occupy Central has around 38 per cent support in the population, and against us is more than 50. But we found that our support amongst people under 29 is more than 50 per cent, and amongst those that have been to university is again more than 50 per cent. And those with a higher average of household income also indicated a higher level of support. This is the type of support that we have: younger people, educated, higher income groups.

LC: That’s very interesting. When you talked about the Occupy influence earlier you said that you took a similar idea but without the anticapitalist or austerity-focused form of politics. But how important do you think socio-economic demands are to reaching out to other social groups in Hong Kong?

BT: We have groups within Occupy Central that want the whole movement to also include campaigning for socio-economic rights. But we think it’s better to keep it simple: that we want to have universal suffrage that is more on the level of democratic and political rights, not socio-economic rights. This is not to say that I personally disagree with this kind of view, but if we include reference to this it will be harder to maintain the unity of the movement that is already on weak grounds in some respects. Now if we had universal suffrage those who wanted to pursue more protection of socio-economic rights would have more opportunities to express their view, and more opportunity to raise these campaigns and demands.

LC: So in terms of the traditional left/right spectrum where would you say that Occupy Central sits or is it difficult to define the movement in these terms?

BT: It is very difficult to say given the situation here. In Hong Kong, when you say “the left” what do you mean by “the left”? In everyday discussion you mean the Communist Party. But interestingly enough in Hong Kong the Communist Party work very closely with business people, the very wealthiest people. But they also have influence over some trade unions. So it’s interesting that this “left” in Hong Kong has among its supporters some who are at the furthest end of the right. You can say that we are on the centre, perhaps. But we also have the labour groups supporting us. We also have the lawyers and professionals who may classify themselves as more on the right, but they are also supporting us. So you cannot put the thing in such a simple way of either left or right. It’s more about the relationship with China. In Hong Kong, we have this very unique situation. The way we draw the line is not the traditional left or right but in our relationship with China. Those who China cannot trust, or those who do not trust China, etc, are on the one side, and those who support the regime are on the other side. This is where the line is drawn.

I hope that if we can achieve universal suffrage we can go back to the normal kind of political spectrum with a left and right. Labour groups whether or not they have a good relationship with China would, in this situation, be able to work together to pursue socio-economic rights. And also some of the political parties that now may be considered anti-Beijing will no doubt join with the businessman in supporting Beijing’s policy in Hong Kong if we had real democracy. There will be a very different political geography once our struggle for universal suffrage has been won.

LC: A student activist I spoke to made a similar point about Communist Party support in Hong Kong that it combines the support of the very, very rich with some of the poorest sections of society. To what extent has the CCP been successful in creating a quasi-civil society, so to speak, around itself in Hong Kong since 1997?

BT: Oh yes I think they have been quite successful. They have been able to utilise the resources of the state to secure this. Take for instance one of the biggest parties in Hong Kong, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), which is the main pro-Beijing political party. They are able to win a lot of seats at the local municipal level because in those elections the voters care more about the services that the district councillors can provide for them. So if the councillors can organise tours to visit the mainland or, at festival time, distribute mooncake, etc, for people living in the district, then they will be popular locally. How are they able to do this? Because they have the resources. Why do they have the resources? Because Beijing is behind them. The DAB also get a lot of money from business people who want to have a close connection to the DAB because of their economic interests in mainland China. Why is this? Well we can say it’s obviously not a communist party now; look at the policies they apply in mainland China. This is a society that is even more capitalist than many capitalist societies! If you want to do business in China then you must have good relations with the CCP. If you want to have good relations with the CCP you have to support the DAB in Hong Kong. These resources are then passed on by the pro-Beijing groups to help people of the lower classes, and it is partly successful in winning their support. So this is the situation.

LC: Some of the people I have spoken to, despite being very supportive of the Occupy Central movement, have in private been quite pessimistic about the situation and the possibility of Beijing conceding to the movement’s demands. But given the CCP has this social base in Hong Kong doesn’t that provide some scope for them to compromise and accept the movement’s democratic demands?

BT: We are making a similar argument. If the anti-Occupy Central movement can assemble over 1 million names supporting their demands then that means they have a very big social base. Why worry about democratic election that they’ll still be able to win? Actually we try to make the point that it’s very unlikely even that Hong Kongers would vote for a Pan-Democrat Chief Executive because they know such a candidate would not be able to work with Beijing. The Communist Party also to some degree understand this. They know that in the coming 2017 election a pro-Beijing candidate, i.e. one Beijing can trust, would be elected. But what they would not want is to see is any possibility of losing whatsoever. They want 100 per cent control over the matter.

LC: Perhaps as a final point we can discuss how your position as a legal scholar relates to all this. The Basic Law – the constitution of Hong Kong that enshrines ‘one country, two systems’ – is a rather unusual historical document because despite being agreed by the Communist Party it protects many basic rights and freedom, such as the rule of law, and establishes an independent judiciary. Given that the judiciary have the power of ‘final adjudication’ over whether laws are deemed constitutional do you see this as important to creating a space for political activism like Occupy Central? And how secure do you believe these rights are?

BT: This is a complicated question. But first thing to say is that I am a researcher into the rule of law in Hong Kong and I am interested in how it can be maintained. I find that the situation of the rule of law is deteriorating and one of the reasons for that is we don’t have a democratic electoral system to put it on a solid foundation. The rule of law is not just judicial independence – yes, this is important and many people emphasise this – but how to ensure judicial independence? You must have sufficient limits on the powers of the executive branch before you can have a good protection of this. And without democratic election the kind of protection will be weaker. As the Hong Kong situation deteriorates in terms of the rule of law we have to find a way to increase these protections. This is why we must have a democratic election. I am not saying that we don’t have a rule of law at the moment – we do – but how to protect it has become the central question when we are under a whole number of challenges. So we need to have a democratic system to sustain the rights that we have properly.

The second thing to say on this is about my own advocacy of civil disobedience, because some people have questioned this on the grounds: how can a law professor tell people to breach the law? This poses questions of what we mean by the rule of law, about the ideal of the rule of law, and what we are struggling for today. This is what Hong Kong people have not understood in the past: the mistaken idea that if you are planning civil disobedience – and therefore planning to breach the law – then you are somehow going against the rule of law. And this is something that the anti-Occupy Central campaign has developed as one of their main points. But the rule of law should not be literally understood as ‘obeying what the law says’. It is rather about whether you have a system of law that can achieve justice, including the political rights and freedoms of the people. So sometimes under certain conditions it is right to breach the law to help us achieve justice. That is the whole spirit of civil disobedience. Other people talking about that may not attract much attention but because I teach law here, at the University of Hong Kong, and am considered to be an expert on the rule of law in Hong Kong, these arguments have been raised over my role in Occupy Central. And this creates an interesting level of theoretical and practical argument within the movement.

LC: And most people I’ve spoken to in the movement think that the rights they enjoy today are more vulnerable than in the past, and that the current situation cannot hold: they can either go forward or back. So to defend what you have at the moment it is necessary to push for more. I assume you would agree with that?

BT: Yes, we see Beijing interfering into Hong Kong affairs more and more. We therefore need a democratic system in Hong Kong to ensure that we enjoy the autonomy that was originally granted under ‘one country, two systems’.

Source: http://www.redpepper.org.uk/the-spirit-of-civil-disobedience/

We, Professors, teachers and staff of Dutch Universities, reply to the call of our academic colleagues in Gaza and condemn in the strongest terms Israel’s excessive and brutal violence against the population in Gaza.

Since the beginning of Israel’s military operation, 1814 people were killed of which at least 1312 were civilians, 214 women and 408 children. 8265 people are wounded, 457.000 internally displaced and the entire 1.8 million population of Gaza has restricted or no access to health care, clean water and sanitary facilities. Israeli bombing and accompanied ground offensive damaged or completely destroyed 9765 houses, 141 schools, 2, universities, 24 health facilities and the only power plant in Gaza.

This cannot be justified as ‘self-defence’ and instead concerns collective punishment of a civilian population, excessive force, and severe and ongoing violation of the most basic human rights of the people in Gaza.

In congruence with statements of colleagues from Israel, the United Kingdom and other places , we, Professors, teachers and staff of Dutch Universities, call for an immediate and unconditional cease fire, for the immediate and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance and for Dutch political representatives and the International community to strongly condemn the ongoing and above mentioned violations of human rights by Israel.

Professors, teachers and staff of Dutch Universities and colleges who signed the statement above:

1. Paul Aarts, Docent internationale betrekkingen, Politicologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
2. Ibtissam Abaaziz, Promovendus, Erasmus Universiteit
3. Dr. Maria Jose de Abreu, Sociologie & Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
4. Dr. Tjitske Akkerman, Afdeling Politicologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
5. Donya Alinejad, Docent Amsterdam University College en promovenda, Sociaal en culturele antropologie, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
6. Anika Altaf, Promovenda, Universiteit van Amsterdam
7. Dr. Juan M. Amaya-Castro, Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
8. Apostolos Andrikopoulos, Promovendus sociologie en Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
9. Dr. Miriyam Aouragh, (Dutch Academic) University of Westminster (Oxford, UK)
10. Nora Asrami, P.hd, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
11. Fatiha Azzarhouni, Docent & programma manager, Universiteit Leiden
12. Dr. Grietje Baars, (Dutch Academic) Law, City University London
13. Dr. Saskia Baas, International Relations, Amsterdam University College
14. M. Babur, Programme Manager Interdisciplinary Social Sciences
15. Tullio Bagnoli, Promovendus, SRON – Netherlands Space Research Institute
16. Dr. Ellen Bal, Afdeling Sociale en Culturele Antropologie, Vrije Universiteit
17. Dr. Sruti Bala, Assistant Professor, Theatre Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam
18. Dr. Markus Balkenhol, Universiteit Utrecht/Meertens Instituut
19. Dr. Maarten Bavinck, Universiteit van Amsterdam
20. Marie Beauchamps Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis, Universiteit van Amsterdam
21. Drs. Tineke Bennema, Universiteit Tilburg
22. Dr. Lidewyde Berckmoes, Postdoc researcher, Maastricht University
23. Filippo Bertoni, Promovendus, Universiteit van Amsterdam
24. Dr. Jess Bier, Postdoctoral Fellow (Onderzoeker), Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
25. Prof.dr. Rutgerd Boelens, Wageningen Universiteit en Universiteit van Amsterdam
26. Drs. Judith van den Boogert, Algemene Sociale Wetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
27. Lisa Bossenbroek, Promovendus, Universiteit Wageningen
28. Che Brandes-Tuka, (Dutch academic) Promovendus, Global Center for Advanced Studies
29. Dr. Pepijn Brandon, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
30. Dr. Christian Bröer, Afdeling Sociologie & Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
31. Kim Bruggeman, MA, Docent Visuele Cultuur Hogeschool van Amsterdam,
32. Jelle Bruinsma, (Dutch academic) History, Durham University
33. Dr. Bram Büscher, Associate Professor , International Institute of Social Studies
34. Prof. dr. S.I. Cohen, Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
35. Francesco Colona, Promovenda, AISSR, Universiteit van Amsterdam
36. Gianmaria Colpani, Promovenda, Media & Culture Studies (Gender Studies), Utrecht University
37. Dr Benoit S.Y. Crutzen, Dept of economics, Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit
38. Dr. Martijn Dekker, ASW & Conflict Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam
39. Amanda Delgado, Promovenda of Linguistic, Universiteit Leiden
40. Stefania Donzelli, Promovenda, International Institute of Social Studies
41. Drs. Brian Droop, Economie & Bedrijfskunde, Universiteit van Amsterdam
42. Prof.dr. John Dugard, Emeritus professor of law, Leiden
43. Prof.dr. Jan Willem Duyvendak, hoogleraar sociologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
44. Ian Sebastiaan Eliëns, MSc, Promovendus, Institute of Physics, Universiteit van Amsterdam
45. Saskia ter Ellen, Promovenda, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
46. Johannes von Engelhardt, MSc, Promovendus en docent Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
47. Dr. Karwan Fatah-Black, Instituut voor Geschiedenis, Universiteit Leiden
48. Annemarie van Geel, MPhil, FFTR, Islamstudies, Radboud University Nijmegen
49. Prof.dr. Halleh Ghorashi, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
50. Dr. Alana Gillespie, Affiliated researcher, ICON Universiteit Utrecht
51. Mariana Gkliati, Promovenda, Leiden University
52. Prof.dr. Marlies Glasius, Department of Politics, Universiteit van Amsterdam
53. Dr. Erella Grassiani, Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
54. Dorine Greshof, Docent Algemene Sociale Wetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
55. Stine Grinna, Promovenda, Universiteit van Amsterdam
56. Dr. Stella Gryllia, Postdoctoral researcher LUCL, Leiden University
57. Dr. Leo de Haan, Hoogleraar Ontwikkelingsstudies, International Institute of Social Studies
58. Dr. Rob Hagendijk, Universitair Hoofd Docent afdeling politicologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
59. Mustafa Hekimoglu, Promovendus Econometrics Institute, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
60. Laura Henderson, Promovenda Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
61. Dr. Silke Heumann, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
62. Lukas Hoex Docent, Instituut voor Interdisciplinaire Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam
63. Ali Honari, Researcher at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam University Amsterdam
64. Shu Yi (Nina) Huang, Promovenda, of Gender Studies, Humanity ,Utrecht University
65. Drs. Hafez Ismaili m’Hamdi, Promovendus Erasmus MC en universitair docent cultuur filosofie Universiteit Leiden
66. Gijsbert van Iterson Scholten, Promovendus Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam & docent University Amsterdam
67. Peyman Jafari, Promovendus Leiden Universiteit
68. Dr. N. Jafari, Resident Neurology Erasmus Medical Center Rotterdam
69. Itandehui Jansen, Universiteit Leiden
70. Marenne Mei Jansen, Promovenda, Amsterdam Centre for Conflict Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam
71. Vanessa de Jesus, Promovenda & Ph.D vertegenwoordiger AISSR, Universiteit van Amsterdam
72. Drs. Shivant Jhagroe, Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
73. Dr. Anne de Jong, Conflict Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam
74. Prof.emer.Dr. E.J. Jonkman, klin. neurofysioloog (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
75. Drs. Reza Kartosen-Wong, Promovendus Amsterdam School of Communication Research, Universiteit van Amsterdam
76. Bahar Kaya, Exchange Coördinator, Universiteit van Amsterdam
77. Dr. A.D.N. (Toon) Kerkhoff, Assistant professor Bestuurskunde, Universiteit Leiden
78. Loes Keysers, Staff Unit International Institute of Social Studies (ISS)
79. Dr. Kate Kirk, Assistant Professor Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam University Amsterdam
80. Dr. Shifra Kisch, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research Universiteit van Amsterdam
81. Dr Anouk de Koning, Antropologie en Ontwikkelingsstudies, Radboud Universiteit
82. Dr. Stasja Koot, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
83. Dr. Froukje Krijtenburg, Afdeling Sociale en Culturele Antropologie, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
84. Dr. Hans de Kruijk, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
85. Dr. Rudi Künzel, Historicus, Universiteit van Amsterdam
86. Milagros Sosa Landeo, Promovendus, Water Resources Management University
87. Jiraporn Laocharoenwong, Promovendus, AISSR, Universiteit van Amsterdam
88. Dr. ir. Y.P.B. (Yves) van Leynseele, AISSR & lecturer Human Geography, Planning and International Development Studies
89. Dr. Mieke Lopes Cardozo, Universiteit van Amsterdam
90. Simone Lovera-Bilderbeek, gast onderzoeker, AISSR, Universiteit van Amsterdam
91. Maja Lovrenovic, Promovenda, Culturele Antropologie Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam University
92. Dr. Arnold Lubbers, Book & Manuscript Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam
93. Dr. M.E. Maeckelbergh, Cultural Anthropology, Leiden University
94. Michael Marchman, Lecturer, Cultural Geography & Study Adviser, Universiteit Wageningen
95. Dr. Vivienne Matthies-Boon, Politicologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
96. Tracian Meikle, Promovendus AISSR, GPIO, Universiteit van Amsterdam
97. Drs. Sander Mensink, Docent Algemene Sociale Wetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
98. Paul Mepschen, Promovendus Sociologie en Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
99. Prof.dr. Michael Merry, Universiteit van Amsterdam
100. Dr. Eva Midden, assistant professor, Utrecht University
101. Irena Mikolajun, Academic staff, Erasmus School of Economics
102. Violeta Misheva, Promovenda, Erasmus Universiteit RotterdamRotterdam
103. Prof. dr. Annelies Moors, Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
104. Lela Mosemghvdlishvili, Promovenda & docent, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
105. Dr. J.C. Muis, Afdeling Sociologie, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
106. Esther van Munster, Congres & Mediacenter Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
107. Dr. Ton van Naerssen, Retired associate professor human geography RU
108. Joyce Neys, Promovenda, Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication, EUR
109. Marjan Nijborg Promovenda, Universiteit van Amsterdam
110. Aysu Okbay, Institution Promovenda, Erasmus School of Economics
111. Dr. Domitilla Olivieri, Humanities, Utrecht University
112. Gezina Oorthuys, studieadviseur Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
113. Merijn Oudenampsen, Promovendus Tilburg Universiteit
114. Dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins, Political science, Universiteit van Amsterdam
115. Dr. Dimitris Pavlopoulos, Assistant Professor Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
116. Dr. Lorenzo Pellegrini, Associate Professor, International Institute of Social Studies
117. Prof.dr. R. Peters, Universiteit van Amsterdam
118. Prof.dr.ir. J.D. (Jan Douwe) van der Ploeg, Wageningen Universiteit
119. Margriet Poppema, Senior Lecturer International Development Studies University of Amsterdam
120. Prof.dr. Mattijs van de Port, Culturele Antropologie, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam en Universiteit van Amsterdam
121. Prof.dr. Jan Pronk, International Institutes of Social Studies, The Hague
122. Zameer Razack, (Dutch academic), Postgraduate Researcher, Bournemouth University
123. Dr. Marina de Regt, Afdeling Sociale en Culturele Antropologie Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
124. Prof.dr. Louk de la Rive Box, Faculteit cultuur en maatschappijwetenschappen, Universiteit Maastricht
125. Dr. Roberto Rocco, assistant professor at the Delft University of Technology
126. Dr. M. van Rossum, Docent Universiteit Leiden
127. Dr. Mirjam A.F. Ros-Tonen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
128. Dr. Dik Roth, Universitair docent, Wageningen Universiteit
129. Jaap Rothuizen, MSc, Faculteit der Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Informatica Universiteit van Amsterdam
130. Dr. Maria Rusca, Senior Lecturer in Water Governance, UNESCO-IHE
131. Rosanne Salimi, Docent Algemene Sociale Wetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
132. Yatun Sastramidjaja, Algemene Sociale Wetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
133. Dr. Mirko Tobias Schäfer, Assistant Professor, Utrecht University
134. Drs. J.W.P. Schnerr, econoom Universiteit van Amsterdam en ziekenhuisbestuurde (gepensioneerd)
135. Joeri Scholtens, MSc, Promovendus, Universiteit van Amsterdam
136. Drs. Patricia Schor, Utrecht University
137. Menno van Setten, MSc, Promovendus Universiteit Utrecht
138. Zara Sharif, Promovenda, Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
139. Aggeliki Sifaki, PhD, Gender Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Utrecht University
140. Dr. Stephanie Simon, Lecturer and Researcher, Universiteit van Amsterdam
141. Jasmijn Slootjes, Promovenda (PhD candidate) Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
142. Wilma Smeets, Medewerker onderwijssecretariaat, Universiteit van Amsterdam
143. Ir. Hermen Smit, Docent/Onderzoeker River Basin Governance UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education
144. Katusha Sol Docent Algemene Sociale Wetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
145. Dr. Olga Sooudi, Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
146. Prof.dr. Irene van Staveren, hoogleraar economie, Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus Universiteit
147. Mikki Stelder, MA,Promovendus, Universiteit van Amsterdam
148. Dr. Jan Willem Stutje Historicus, Universiteit Gent
149. Nozomi Takahashi, Biotechnology. University of Nijmegen (currently University, Belgium)
150. Margaret Tali, Researcher en Promovenda, Universiteit van Amsterdam
151. Karolien van Teijlingen, Promovenda, CEDLA, Universiteit van Amsterdam
152. Annisa Triyanti, M.Sc,Promovenda in AISSR, Universiteit van Amsterdam
153. Bertus Tulleners, Docent, Instituut voor Interdisciplinaire Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam
154. Dr. Ineke van der Valk, Fac. Maatschappij en Gedragswetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
155. Dr. Piia Varis, Tilburg University
156. Prof.dr. Kees (CG) van der Veer, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Amsterdam en Transcend Peace University (Basel)
157. Dr. Imrat Verhoeven, afdeling politicologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
158. Dr. Hebe Verrest, Universiteit van Amsterdam
159. Sanderien Verstappen, Promovenda Universiteit van Amsterdam
160. Marloes Vlind, Msc, docent Sociologie Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
161. Else Vogel, Promovenda antropologie aan de universiteit van Amsterdam
162. Lior Volinz, Promovendus, AISSR, Universiteit van Amsterdam
163. Dr. Doro Wiese, Comparative Literature and Gender Studies, Universiteit Utrecht
164. Mandy de Wilde, Promovenda Afdeling Sociologie en Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam
165. Dr. Mariëtt Willems, Neuroloog ErasmusMC Rotterdam
166. Fleur Wirtz, Docent Sociologie, Vrije universiteit Amsterdam
167. M.C. Wittendorp, Ph.D, Docent Medische biologie, Hogeschool Leiden
168. Prof.emer.Dr. W.G. Wolters, emeritus hoogleraar economische antropologie, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen,
169. Taylan Yenilmez, Promovendus, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Department of Economic
170. Mohammed Zarouali, Docent Eurocollege, Rotterdam
171. Marius A. Zoican, Mphil, Promovendus, Finance Department, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
172. Christel Zwaga, Education Service Centre, Universiteit van Amsterdam
173. Prof.dr. Margreet Z. Zwarteveen, Professor Water Governance, Universiteit van Amsterdam
174. Prof.dr. Evert van der Zweerde, Hoogleraar Politieke filosofie, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

Dat meldt 925 (nine to five), een nieuwssite die is opgezet door BN’er Jort Kelder. Op het adres waar de holding volgens de Kamer van Koophandel is gehuisvest, wijst op het eerste gezicht niets op een Russische connectie. Alleen de automerken Renault en Nissan prijken op de geelbruin marmeren gevel van het pand vlak achter de ING aan de Zuidas.

Maar Alliance Rostec Auto BV dat schuil gaat achter dit adres, is in Nederland de piek op de kerstboom van bedrijven die schuiven met geld om maar zo min mogelijk belasting te hoeven betalen. Via allerlei constructies is het verbonden met Rostec, een staatsbedrijf dat de Russische export bevordert, en Rosoboronexport, de Russische wapenfabrikant die jaarlijks 10 miljard euro aan wapens exporteert.

Koude Oorlog
Rosoboronexport is de opvolger van een reeks kleinere Russische wapentuigfabrikanten als MiG (gevechtsvliegtuigen), Sukhoi (onbemande vliegtuigen) en Yakovlev (bommenwerpers). Die bedrijven moesten de Sovjettroepen tijdens de Koude Oorlog met het Westen laten concurreren. Ook de luchtdoelraket waarmee de MH-17 donderdag uit de lucht zou zijn geschoten, stamt uit deze tijd.

Na het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet-Unie begin jaren negentig moesten de bedrijven op zoek naar andere afzetmarkten. Die werden gevonden in de wereld van dictators: wijlen kolonel Kadhafi van Libië, Omar-al Bashir van Soedan en Bashar al Assad van Syrië.

De link met Alliance Rostec Auto BV loopt weer via Avtovas een andere spin in het web van bv’s. Deze Russische autofabriek werd eind jaren zestig opgezet in samenwerking met Fiat.

Het is gezien de omstandigheden cynisch, maar de manier waarop Rostec zijn financiën regelt, is niet uitzonderlijk, zegt een onderzoeker op basis van anonimiteit. ‘Het legt nu op een pijnlijke manier bloot wie je vrienden zijn. Het verklaart ook waarom premier Rutte terughoudend optreedt. Nederland is de bakermat voor de Russische elite die hier miljarden heeft gestald.’

Source: http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/31522/Vliegtuigcrash-in-Oekraine/article/detail/3692779/2014/07/21/Leverancier-van-raket-MH17-zetelt-op-de-Amsterdamse-Zuidas.dhtml